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ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS CONDUCIVE TO INDIGENOUS THIRD 
WORLD ARMS PRODUCTION 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
I INTRODUCTION 
Despite the heated debate over the presumed high opportunity cost associated with 
domestic production of armaments in Third World countries, remarkably little empirical 
attention has been devoted to the economic sources of national military industrial 
capabilities. The literature is increasing rapidly, however, with a number of relatively 
recent studies (Vayrynen, 1983; Katz, 1984, 1986; Brzoska and Ohlson, 1986; Evans, 
1986; Deger and Sen, 1985; Wulf, 1985; Tuomi and Vayrynen, 1982; Wulfetal, 1980; 
Harkavy, 1975; and Peleg, 1980) examining political and power relationships associated 
with Third World arms production. Few studies have, however, examined the economic 
conditions conducive to arms production in the Third World, and the relative importance 
of economic considerations in the establishment of these industries. 
Recently, Stephanie Neuman (1984) has raised the question of "why for example 
do some states produce arms while others do not?" (Neuman, 1984, p. 181 ). Neuman is, 
in fact, one of the few researchers who have attempted to determine the critical 
characteristics that set Third World arms producers apart from those countries who have 
not developed a domestic arms industry'. , 
Her general hypothesis and regression results indicate (Neuman, 1984, p. 173) that: 
What emerges within the Third World from these data is a hierarchically 
shaped arms production system based largely on factors of scale. In each 
region, the largest defense producers are generally those countries with the 
biggest militaries and GNPs which dwarf quantitatively, if not always 
qualitatively, the capabilities of their smaller, poorer neighbors. 
Clearly, however, Neuman's results and conclusions apply only in a general sort of 
way, given numerous smaller countries - Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Dominican Republic, 
for example - whose arms industries would not be anticipated in the light of their small 
economic size and relatively limited level of military expenditures. 
I. Anns producers as defined by Neuman and used here are those countries producing at least one major 
weapon system (Neuman, 1984, pp, 172-73), 
.;,.-_ 
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The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the possession of a limited 
number of economic characteristics is necessary and sufficient to predict with a high 
degree of probability whether or not a Third World country is likely to possess a 
domestic arms industry. More specifically, is there a unique set of economic characteristics 
that set apart the Third World arms producers from the non-producers? 
The main findings of the analysis2 below are that the critical, if not necessarily 
sufficient, condition for Third World production (and non-production) can be identified. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom as to the factors facilitating arms production, 
neither the magnitude of the nation's military expenditures nor its economic size play 
a major role in delineating producers from non-producers. Instead, producers and non-
producers can be differentiated on the basis of a multidimensional set of factors, largely 
economic. Here, the economic factors critical to arms production are essentially those 
involving access to foreign exchange. However, the precise manner in which foreign 
exchange facilitates arms production tends to vary from region to region, with external 
public debt relatively more important in Latin America. 
II METHODOLOGY 
The data set used for the analysis contained a variety of economic, demographic, 
and political indicators for ninety-six developing countries3• Of these, twenty-eight 
were classified as military producers by Neuman (1984, p. 173), i.e. producers of at 
least one major weapons system in the 1979-80 period. Due to missing observations for 
several countries in the economic-military data base, most of the analysis dealt with 
forty-nine countries, nineteen which produce arms and thirty which do not. 
To determine the extent to which economic variables could correctly classify arms 
producers and non-producers, several sets of variables were first examined to see if their 
mean values for the producer and non-producer countries were significantly different. 
The variables selected were representative of broad, structural performance, and defense-
related differences between developing countries: 
1. External balance of payments variables; 
2. External debt variables; 
3. Fiscal savings variables; 
4. Composition of gross domestic product variables; 
5. Defense variables; 
6. Performance variables and 
7. Size variables. 
2. The time frame for the analysis undertaken below is 1980. This period roughly coincides with 
Neuman's classification scheme (1·979/80). This period was also selected because it came at the end of 
a decade of rapidly increased Third World borrowing in external markets. It is clear that external 
financial markets changed fundamentally after the de facto Mexican default in 1982. Also this period 
marks the end of the world-wide boom in exports and imports. The period of analysis therefore 
captures the culmination of developments in external markets that may have affected Third World arms 
production. Because of the drying up of external capital tr11nsfers to developing countries after 1982, 
and the slowing down of exports from this group of countries, the analysis below suggests that the 
forces affecting the creation of indigenous arms industries were even more important in the mid to 
latter 1980s. Hence the conclusions drawn from this analysis are likely to continue to hold through the 
1980s. 
3. Economic and social variables are taken from World Bank (1982, 1983, 1984). Military expenditures 
and defense-related variables are from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ( 1984 ). 
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An examination of the means (Table I) of the arms and non-arms producers 
indicates that: 
1. As noted by Neuman, arms producers do in fact tend to have larger geographic 
areas, higher gross domestic products, larger populations, armed forces and 
military expenditures. 
2. Interestingly enough, the arms and non-arms producers have nearly the same 
per capita incomes. 
3. Arms producers tend to have less export instability, a stronger growth in 
imports, a higher percentage of exports in GDP and, in recent years, a better 
export performance. 
4. The arms producers, due to their larger size, have undoubtedly accumulated 
higher volumes of external indebtedness, but lower overall debt burdens (in 
terms of debt as a percent of GDP) than the non-producers. 
5. The savings performance of the arms producers is distinctly superior to that of 
the non-producers. 
6. The arms producers, as might be expected, tend to have a much higher share 
of manufactures in GDP than the non-arms producers. 
7. Although having larger armies and levels of military expenditures than their 
non-arms counterparts, the producing countries tend to devote less to defense 
as a share of GNP, or on a per capita basis. 
8. While the overall economic performance of the arms and the non-arms producers 
are fairly similar (with the arms producers experiencing higher overall rates of 
growth) the level of international reserves accumulated by the defense producers 
considerably outweighed that of the non-arms producers. 
In short, the arms producers are larger, more open to external trade, have more external 
debt, higher savings, and had more dynamic import and export performances than the 
non-producing countries. , 
Given these diverse differences between arms and non-arms producing countries, it 
seems likely that no one single underlying factor has been necessary and sufficient for 
the establishment of an indigenous arms industry in the Third World. Instead, the 
factors associated with arms production are likely to be multidimensional. 
One analytical approach capable of identifying which combination of the factors 
described above is necessary and sufficient for predicting indigenous arms production 
in the Third World is multiple discriminant analysis (MDA).4 
Numerous applications of MDA to identification problems based on profile data 
have been made. In past research, MDA has been used primarily as a method of 
studying profile relationships among several groups and for classifying individual 
entities into groups (Klett, 1972; and Jones, 1980). This paper, however, makes use of 
a specific aspect of MDA which is frequently ignored; that is, its ability to provide the 
best statistical basis (in a least squares sense) for computing estimates of the specific 
probabilities of a Third World country achieving the status of arms producer.5 
4. See Tables 2 and 3 in the text for a listing of the producers and non producers included in the 
discriminant analysis. 
5, The program used for the analysis below was from the Statistical Analysis System (1982) statistical 
package. See SAS User's Guide: Statistics. 1982 Edition, 
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TABLE 1 
STRUCTURAL, PERFORMANCE AND DEFENSE EXPENDITURE DIFFERENCES: 




EXTERNAL/BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
RBB Resource balance -4.7 -11.6 
ZGA Growth in imports 1960-70 5.4 6.0 
ZGB Growth in imports 1970-80 5.8 3.2 
EGA Growth in exports 1960-70 5.7 9.6 
EGB Growth in exports 1970-80 4.9 --0.7 
CA Current account balance -2,593 791.5 
EXTERNAL DEBT 
PDB Outstanding external debt 11.987 154.8 
PDPB Debt as share of GDP 18.2 35.I 
PBCB External borrowing commitment 2975.4 381.6 
ECNIB Net inflow of public capital 1463.9 98.7 
FISCAL/SAVINGS (%GDP) 
AS Average national savings 20.7 15.2 
MS Average marginal savings 19.5 8.6 
PCB Government consumption 16.7 14.5 
GDIB Gross domestic investment 14.8 17.3 
COMPOSITION OF GDP 
AG Share of agriculture 18.5 29.4 
MAN Share of Manufacturing 18.1 10.2 
EB Share of Exports 32.8 24.9 
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
ME Military expenditures 1,597.9 936.7 
AF Armed forces 220.3 68.3 
MEY ME share of GNP 4.1 5.5 
MEP ME per capita 110.5 147.2 
PERFORMANCE VARIABLES 
EI Export instability ( 1967 n I) 8.6 10.8 
GDPGA GDP Growth, 1960-70 5.8 5.4 
GDPGB GDP Growth, 1970-80 5.2 3.7 
GIR Gross international Reserves 476.3 122.6 
YP Per capita income 1,749.6 1,795.0 
SIZE VARIABLES 
AREA Area • 1,280.2 502.8 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 47,835.9 9,529.8 
POP Population 67.9 10.9 
Note: Unless otherwise specified, figures are average values for the 1970-80 period. 
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III RESULTS 
To determine the relative importance of these broad factors in differentiating the 
producing countries from those not possessing an indigenous arms industry, a step-wise 
discriminant analysis was performed using. the variables in Table I as independent 
discriminating variables. Seven variables (based on the F statistic) were found to be 
statistically significant in differentiating producers from non-producers. 
As might be anticipated (Tables 2 and 3), total military expenditures (ME) was the 
variable most significant in differentiating arms from non-arms producers. 
Following military expenditures in order of importance were: ( 1) public external 
debt, (2) the net inflow of public capital, (3) the government's external borrowing 
commitment, (4) gross international reserves, (5) area, and (6) the current account in the 
balance of payments. 
Contrary to Neuman's analysis, variables such as gross national product, population 
and armed forces were not statistically significant for the purpose of differentiating 
arms from non-arms producers. Furthermore, by itself total military expenditures provided 
little discriminating power between arms and non-arms producers. Using this variable, 
TABL.E 2 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: RESULTS FOR THE ARMS PRODUCERS 
(probability of correct classification) 
Discriminating Variables 
II III 
ME ME GIR 
ME PDB PDB AREA 
EC NIB EC NIB CA 
Arms Producer PBCB PBCB 
Israel 64.9 68.4 99.3 
India 58.7 94.8 100.0 
Nigeria 53.0 88.2 100.0 
Indonesia 55.3 99.9 100.0 
South Korea 64.9 94.7 99.9 
Singapore 46.3* 45.9* 100.0 
Pakistan 43.8* 85.6 100.0 
Venezuela 46.3* 69.3 100.0 
Mexico 42.9* 100.0 100.0 
Brazil 50.2 100.0 100.0 
Philippines 46.1* 62.9 96.3 
Ecuador 44.l* 23.1* 46.2* 
Colombia 42.9* 83.4 97.1 
Thailand 47.5*. 72.8 100.0 
Malaysia 48.4* 86.3 53.8 
Dominican Rep 47.l* 32.9* 43.7* 
Chile 47.2* 56.8 96.l 
Argentina 59.4 32.7* 34.9* 
Peru 48.2 93.6 98.4 
Note: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables used in the discriminant analysis. 
* indicates misclassification, i.e., a producer country was classified as a non-producer. 
Economic Environments Conducive to Indigenous Third World Arms Production 71 
TABLE 3 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: RESULTS FOR THE NON-ARMS PRODUCERS 
(probability of correct classification) 
Discriminating Variables 
I II III 
ME ME ME GIR 
PDB PDB AREA 
ECNIB EC NIB CA 
Country PBCB PBCB 
Cameroon 55.6 88.2 100.0 
Sudan 52.1 82.9 100.0 
Costa Rica 54.9 91.9 99.0 
Bolivia 52.8 89.7 99.9 
Togo 54.7 93.7 99.3 
Tunisia 56.1 89.0 99.7 
Rwanda 52.9 88.3 100.0 
Guatemala 53.2 91.8 99.9 
Malawi 52.7 93.8 100.0 
El Salvador 53.0 86.0 98.0 
Turkey 41.8* 66.2 67.2 
Paraguay 55.8 85. l 99.3 
Algeria 46.7* 60.9 100.0 
Libya 53.1 93.0 90.3 
Ivory Coast 52.9 70.1 99.9 
Mauritania 54.8 88.0 100.0 
Congo 54.1 91.9 100.0 
Sierra Leone 54.2 90.4 96.5 
Panama 54.1 76.2 97.3 
Uruguay 53.0 88.3 90.8 
Madagascar 53.5 90.1 100.0 
Ethiopia 54.8 92.7 100.0 
CAR 53.0 90.0 98.4 
Ghana 53.9 92.7 99.9 
Zaire 55.l 91.5 100.0 
Jamaica 54.2 94.8 99.3 
Zimbabwe 56.3 79.3 98.5 
Kuwait 53.l 85.2 92.0 
Kenya 52.9 88.1 99.3 
Jordan 51.4 89.8 93.3 
Note: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables used in the discriminant analysis. 
* indicates misclassification, i.e., a non-producer country was classified as a producer. 
eleven of the nineteen arms producers were classified incorrectly, as were two of the 
thirty non-arms producers. The overall probability of correct placement was also very 
low for most countries in each group. • 
A clear improvement in delineation between the groups is made adding the next 
three variables-public external debt (PDB), the net flow of public capital (ECNIB), and 
the external borrowing commitments of the public sector (PBCB). These four variables 
were capable of correctly (and with a high degree of probability) classifying all of the 
non-oroducers. 
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Four of the producing countries were still incorrectly classified, however. Further-
more the degree of probability with which producing countries were correctly classified 
was much lower than that obtained for the non-producers. Clearly a limited number of 
discriminating variables are far superior at predicting the conditions under which Third 
World arms production is unlikely to occur, than at identifying the countries in which 
arms production has actually been established. 
Increasing the number of discriminating variables to eight raises the overall average 
probability of correct classification of countries as non-arms producers to over 98 
percent, while at the same time increasing the average probability of correctly classifying 
the producing countries to well over 90 percent. However, in the environment defined 
by these eight variables, three countries - Ecuador, Dominican Republic and Argentina 
- are classified as non-arms producers. 
With regard to the non-producers, all received a high probability of correct placement 
except for Turkey. Neuman classified Turkey as a non-producer based on the fact that 
the country did not produce a major weapon system. However, it is clear (f\.yres, 1983) 
that the country does have a large indigenous arms industry. Based on its overall level 
of industrial development and expertise, Turkey may be something of a gray area, given 
Neuman 's classification scheme. 
A number of political variables were added to the data set to see if further 
discrimination between arms and non-anns producers could be obtained. The results 
were not, however, improved over those obtained using the eight economic variables. 
Obviously, the only thing Equador, Argentina and the Dominican Republic have in 
common is their geographic location. Are the conditions conducive to arms production 
different in Latin America from the rest of the world? To test this hypothesis, our 
sample of developing countries was split into a Latin American and a non-Latin 
American grouping. As with the total sample, a step-wise discriminant analysis was 
performed on each geographic group to determine those variables that were statistically 
significant in delineating producers from non-producers. 
RESULTS: NON-LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
The non-Latin American sample countries consist of twenty-eight non-producers 
and eleven producers (Table 4 ). 
As was done for the total sample of countries (Tables 2 and 3), several discriminant 
functions were formed for the non-Latin American countries by increasing the number 
of independent variables in the analysis: 
I. By itself, ECNIB correctly classifies (Table 4) all but two producers and two 
non-producers. 
2. Adding the current account balance (CA) results in a correct placement of all 
producing countries (and with an average probability of correct placement at 
over 95 percent). Two non-producers, Turkey and Morocco, were, however, 
incorrectly classified. 
3. Utilizing all five statistically significoant variables in the discriminant function 
markedly improved the results with only Egypt (with probability of correct 
placement 69.4), Turkey (with a probability of correct placement of 74.3), and 
Morocco (with a probability of correct placement of 79. l ), falling outside the 
sharply delineated groupings of producers and non-producers. 
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TABLE 4 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS OF NON-LA TIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(probability of correct classification) 
Discriminating Variables 
I II III 
ECNIB EC NIB ECNIB GIR 
CA CA PBCB EGB 
ARMS PRODUCERS 
Israel 75.3 100.0 100.0 
India 99.8 100.0 100.0 
Nigeria 93.7 99.9 100.0 
Indonesia 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Egypt 95.4 91.4 95.7 
South Korea 99.3 100.0 100.0 
Singapore 5.7* 97.3 100.0 
Pakistan 19.4* 100.0 100.0 
Philippines 97.4 87.0 94.6 
Thailand 82.9 95.6 99.0 
Malaysia 100.0 100.0 100.0 
NON-PRODUCERS 
Cameroon 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sudan 96.7 97.0 100.0 
Somalia 97.3 99.9 100.0 
Togo 99.9 99.9 100.0 
Tunisia 94.9 100.0 100.0 
Morocco 10.7* 27.3* 82.7 
Rwanda 99.9 100.0 100.0 
Malawi 99.5 100.0 100.0 
Turkey 2.7* 45.3 69.2 
Algeria 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Libya 99.1 100.0 100.0 
Ivory Coast 50.7 97.2 100.0 
Mauritania 99.2 99.9 100.0 
Sierra Leone 99.6 100.0 100.0 
Chad 99.9 100.0 100.0 
Madagascar 97.0 99.9 100.0 
Tanzania 98.l 99.8 100.0 
Uganda 99.9 100.0 100.0 
Ethiopia 98.9 99.9 100.0 
CAR 99.9 99.9 100.0 
Ghana 99.3 100.0 100.0 
Burma 92.7 99.1 100.0 
Zaire 99.5 99.9 100.0 
Zambia 98.0 .100.0 100.0 
Saudi Arabia 99.7 99.9 100.0 
Kenya 97.4 99.9 100.0 
Syria 98.5 99.9 100.0 
Jordan 97.3 99.1 100.0 
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In general, however, whether a non-Latin-American country is a producer or a non-
producer of arms depends largely on the volume of recent inflows of public and publicly 
guaranteed external capital. For the most part, the non-Latin-American countries not 
experiencing large and relatively recent inflows of external capital are not capable, 
regardless of their size or level of industrial sophistication, of either justifying or 
sustaining the on-going production of at least one major weapons system. 
Interestingly enough, military expenditures per se play no role whatsoever in 
determining whether a non-Latin-American country will possess an indigenous arms 
industry. 
An examination of the means of the discriminating and related variables for the 
non-Latin-American producers and non-producers confirms the high level of capital 
inflows and foreign exchange earnings associated with the producers, and the relatively 
low level of external inflows and export earnings associated with the non-producers. 
Even though the growth in producing countries greatly exceeded that of the non-
producers during 1970-80, producers' current account deficits were significantly higher 
than the non-producers'. 
RESULTS: LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
For the Latin American countries as a group, a completely different picture emerges. 
For this group of countries, export growth (Table 5) between 1960 and 1970 (EGA) was 
the most important variable in differentiating between producing and non-producing 
countries. This was followed by: (I) the total public external debt accrued as of 1980 
(PDB), and (2) the growth of imports 1960-70 (ZGA). 
Note that the variables statistically significant in discriminating Latin American 
arms from non-arms producers are different from those for the non-Latin-American 
countries. 
The results for the Latin American sample indicate that: 
I. Using only export growth in the 1960s (EGA), all but four countries are 
correctly classified. This increases to all but one when the public external debt 
outstanding in 1980 is added to the discriminant function. 
2. Latin American arms producers and non-arms producers can be correctly 
classified (with an average probability of correct placement of over 98 percent 
for both) with only three variables - export and import growth, 1960-70 (EGA 
and ZGA) and the accumulated public external debt in 1980 (PDB). 
3. More significantly, a sharp delineation takes place between producers and non-
producers with 99.3 the lowest probability of correct placement. 
Looking at the means of the discriminating variables (Table 5), the Latin American 
producers achieved lower growth in exports and imports in the 1960s than did the non-
producers, although the producers' external public debt was significantly higher by the 
beginning of the 1980s. • 
From these results it appears that arms production in Latin America is largely the 
result of import-substitution policies accompanied undoubtedly by high levels of 
protectionism in the 1960s. The industries survived in the 1970s largely due to rapid 
increases in foreign external borrowing. 
In sum, there is a sharp contrast between the environment in which Latin American 
arms production takes place and the conditions in which it is present in the rest of the 
world: 
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TABLE 5 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS OF LATIN AMERICAN ARMS, NON-ARMS PRODUCERS 































I II III 
EGA EGA EGA 
PDB PDB 
ZGA 
96.1 99.7 100.0 
78.1 100.0 100.0 
41.8* 100.0 100.0 
85.4 62.9 99.6 
87.4 99.3 100.0 
90.7 99.9 100.0 
97.2 100.0 100.0 
71.8 99.9 100.0 
91.4 98.3 100.0 
98.5 100.0 100.0 
99.4 100.0 100.0 
98.l 100.0 100.0 
98.3 100.0 100.0 
97.6 100.0 100.0 
74.8 99.1 99.9 
60.2 97.0 99.3 
99.0 100.0 100.0 
14.5* 40.2* 99.4 
49.8* 95.6 100.0 
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1. The conditions facilitating Latin American arms production seem to have been 
established largely in the 1960s, and involved the creation, through export 
growth and external borrowing, of a high import capacity. Presumably, this 
import capacity was necessary to facilitate the high level of technology transfer, 
capital equipment, and so on needed to establish an indigenous arms industry. 
2. It should be noted that the only new Latin American arms producers between 
1969-70 and 1979-80 were Mexico, Ecuador, and Venezuela, all of which 
were oil exporters whose access to foreign exchange was enhanced during the 
period. 
3. The non-Latin-American arms producers appear to be highly dependent on a 
steady infusion of public externally borrowed funds. Overall export and import 
performance does not appear to be critical in the establishment or maintenance 
of an indigenous arms industry. Instead, the ability to finance existing current 
account deficits though publicly guaranteed loans appears critical. It follows 
that the non-Latin-American arms industries may be less viable than those in 
Latin America. 
4. Interestingly enough, for both the Latin American and non-Latin-American 
countries, economic size, per capita income, military capabilities or associated 
economies of scale in production do not appear to be either necessary or 
sufficient conditions for undertaking indigenous arms production. Instead, 
access to foreign exchange presumably required to facilitate imported 
inputs-both technical and material-for actual arms production appears to be 
the main factor determining whether arms production will be established and 
viable over time. 
5. Foreign exchange availability by and of itself is a multi-dimensional factor, 
and not associated with one specific index such as export growth or inflows of 
externally borrowed funds .. 
6. The above findings are consistent with and reinforce those obtained by Ayres 
(1983, p. 814). In his analysis of the stages typically associated with domestic 
arms production, the first several are heavily foreign exchange intensive: 
a) Arms are imported, but are serviced and maintained domestically; 
b) A license to produce arms is acquired and production facilities are built 
requiring huge technical and personnel assistance from the supplier; 
c) Production starts and to begin with involves local assembly of imported 
sub-assemblies; 
d) The sub-assemblies are assembled locally from imported components and 
sometimes re-exported to the licenser; 
e) Components are manufactured locally from imported raw materials; 
f) Local production of raw materials, and 
g) Complete, indigenous production including design, raw materials and 
manufacture. 
Ayres (1984) notes, however, that eve.n those LDC's such as India which have been 
pursuing military self-sufficiency for many years have not reached stages f and g. 
IV CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The major finding of this study is that economic rather than strategic/political 
variables were, at least during the 1970s, the crucial determinants of whether arms 
production was undertaken by a developing country. However, contrary to casual 
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analysis it is apparent that the economic factors with intuitive appeal - GNP, population, 
size of the industrial sector, and so on - were not critical during this period for the 
creation or maintenance of a viable arms industry in the Third World. 
Perhaps the major finding of the analysis above was that access to relatively large 
amounts of foreign exchange tends to be the key element associated with arms production 
in the Third World. Having said this, it is clear that relatively abundant foreign exchange 
inflows are not necessarily an indispensable and sufficient condition for the establishment 
and survival of Third World arms industries. The fact that Kuwait and Algeria, countries 
with relatively abundant supplies of foreign exchange in the 1970s, were not producers 
of arms clearly suggests that while foreign exchange may greatly facilitate arms 
production, it does not guarantee that production will actually take place. Similarly, the 
periodic foreign exchange shortages experienced by India, the Philippines and the 
Dominican Republic during the 1970s suggest that other extenuating circumstances 
may from time to time assume a more important role than foreign exchange in determining 
whether arms industries will continue to survive (India and the Dominican Republic) or 
be established (the Philippines). ' 
More fundamentally, given the nature of the data (i.e. the lack of time series figures 
on the identity of producers and non-producers, together with the lack of information on 
production levels) it is impossible to determine conclusively whether relative access to 
foreign exchange is a necessary condition for the establishment or the survival of a 
domestic arms industry. Still, the results presented above do strongly suggest that if 
countries desiring to produce arms have relatively poor access to foreign exchange, they 
are unlikely to be able to justify either the creation or maintenance of indigenous arms 
production. 
The relative importance of foreign exchange in affecting Third World arms 
production probably stems from the fact that Third World arms producers are not yet 
completely self-sufficient in either the technical or material inputs required for arms 
production. Instead, the establishment of an indigenous arms industry places high and 
continuous demands on a country's foreign 'exchange reserves (Brzoska, 1983 ). Terhal 
( 1982, pp. 251-259) estimates that in the late 1960s, military claims on foreign exchange 
in India were nearly half of India's civil imports of machinery and equipment. Given the 
fact that few of the existing Third World arms producers are likely to develop completely 
integrated arms industries in the near future, we can expect relative access to foreign 
exchange to continue playing, at least in the foreseeable future, a major role in determining 
the patterns of arms production in this part of the world. 
One of Neuman's (1984, pp. 172-73) major concerns was the rapid expansion of 
Third World arms producers-from 5 in 1950 up to 21 in 1969-70 and 26 by 1979-80. 
What are the prospects that this trend towards an increasing number of Third World 
arms producers will continue? 
The results of the discriminant analysis suggest that there should be no new Latin 
American arms producers in the foreseeable future. Given the poor export prospects for 
most of the non-producers together with their high levels of external debt, it is extremely 
unlikely that any of these countries will have sufficient surpluses of foreign exchange 
to allocate toward the development of an indigenous arms industry. 
The situation is somewhat less apparent for the non-Latin-American countries, 
since for this group of countries continuous access to publicly guaranteed external 
capital inflows appears to be critical for the establishment and survival of a domestic 
arms industry. Clearly, if the major First World arms producers wanted to restrict the 
spread of new indigenous production to this area of the world, denial of credits at past 
levels might be an effective policy. Given the fungibility of money and credit, however, 
the scope for action in this area may be somewhat limited. 
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